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NOTICE 
Cyberdemons: Regulating a Truly World-Wide Web 
Andrew P. L ycans* 
BEYOND OUR CONTROL?: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR 
LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE. By Stuart Biegel. 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2001. Pp. v, 452. Cloth, $34.95. 
In the decade leading up to the twenty-first century, the number of 
Internet-related legal disputes grew exponentially. This growth con­
tinues into the new millennium, introducing old problems in a new 
context. For instance, in the field of copyright, Eric Eldred, the opera­
tor of a website dedicated to posting literary works already in the 
public domain, challenged the Copyright Term Extension Act 
("CTEA").1 The CTEA blocked his plans to post works copyrighted 
in 1923, works which under the previous statute would have entered 
the public domain in 1999.2 Looking to trademark law, the field has 
become obsessed of late with providing a quick and easy way for 
trademark holders to regain domain names from cybersquatters with­
out "paying them off. "3 In the First Amendment arena, the Internet 
continues to present challenges to the concept of a community stan­
dard of decency in obscenity jurisprudence.4 The Ninth Circuit re­
cently pushed the boundaries of jurisdictional law, in an interesting 
example of the courts keeping pace with the times, when it ruled that 
plaintiffs could deliver service of process by e-mail when the defen­
dant resides outside the country, if the plaintiff obtains a court 
* The author would like to thank Anna-Rose Mathieson and Roberta J. Morris for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003). 
2. Plaintiff's complaint, Eldred, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003), available at http://eon.law.harvard. 
edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint_orig.html. Eldred operates Eldritch press 
(http://eldritchpress.org) and had anticipated posting such works as New Hampshire by Rob­
ert Frost, Horses and Men by Sherwood Anderson, and Racundra's First Cruise by Arthur 
Ransome, all written in 1923 and scheduled to come off copyright in 1999. 
3. See generally JANE c. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFA I R  COMPETITION 
LAW765-829 (2001). 
4. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (discussing at length whether 
the community-standards test should apply online where distributors neither know nor could 
know the location of the websurfers accessing the site). 
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order allowing service of process by e-mail under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(f)(3).5 
Amid these decisions, Stuart Biegel6 attempts to craft a model of 
when and how regulators should go about attempting to bring order to 
the perceived anarchy of cyberspace. Biegel begins by noting "the 
commonly accepted notion that no one is in charge" of the Internet (p. 
3), then goes on to debunk this notion by listing a number of agencies 
and groups that attempt to exert some level of control over the Net 
and "Netizens."7 He then compares perceptions of Internet regulation 
to popular notions of the law in the American Old West, demonstrat­
ing how both differ significantly from reality.8 
Before devising a new regulatory model, Biegel asks whether the 
Internet presents a new entity, something distinct from what came 
before, and for which no elaborate and extensive bodies of law already 
exist (pp. 25-26). After a short review of the possibly analogous bodies 
of law,9 Biegel concludes that the Internet clearly entails something 
different, leaving only the question of whether it "merit[ s] new and 
different approaches to regulatory issues" (p. 31). Although Biegel 
answers this question sometimes yes, sometimes no, he arrives at this 
conclusion only after a (maybe overly) exhaustive review of previous 
popular and scholarly works. Given his goal of debunking some 
popular misconceptions, perhaps this analysis serves Biegel well in 
coming to a realistic answer about the need to regulate. 
The belief that regulating cyberspace presents an all-or-nothing 
proposition represents the chief misconception Biegel dispels.10 He 
emphasizes that regulators may decide to regulate some areas of 
cyberspace while leaving others alone, and that they may take differ­
ent approaches when regulating different conduct in cyberspace. 
These points stand out as Biegel's main contributions in this work (p. 
119). Many pioneer Netizens have a libertarian bent and believe that 
5. See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'! Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (2002). Fittingly, the 
underlying dispute involved trademark infringement, specifically the defendant's chosen 
domain name. Id. at 1012-13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) states: 
Service Upon Individuals in a Foreign Country. Unless otherwise provided by federal law. 
service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than 
an infant or incompetent person, may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of 
the United States . . . by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be 
directed by the court. 
6. Professor of Education and Information Studies, Professor of Law, UCLA. 
7. Pp. 4-12. Occupants of cyberspace frequently refer to themselves as Netizens, an ab­
breviation based on an abbreviation (Net for Internet and Netizen for Internet Citizen). 
8. P. 7. Biegel does this by using the plots of Western movies. Shane represents the best 
metaphor to the Internet in his view. P. 18. 
9. He considers if the Internet is analogous to a library, a phone system, a park, a televi­
sion, or a newspaper. Pp. 26-27. 
10. P. 51.  Biegel clarifies the all or nothing terminology by saying: "Control or no con­
trol. Censorship or no censorship. Rules or no rules." P. 51.  
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the government should avoid any form of cyberspace regulation, 
though as Biegel points out some of these "libertarians" asked the 
government to step in to limit what private entities can achieve 
through the Internet (p. 193). Similarly, regulators may tend to view 
the Internet as a monolithic entity, and believe comprehensive regula­
tion indispensable to crafting an adequate response to any cyberprob­
lem (pp. 51-54, 119). Biegel maintains regulation in this area could 
very well prove more effective, and regulators could better avoid unin­
tended consequences, if they considered particular problem areas 
individually (p. 54). 
This Notice argues that, though following the model might help 
would-be regulators analyze "cyberproblems," Biegel fails to accu­
rately apply the model in the examples he provides. Part I describes 
Biegel's model for categorizing cyberspace problems and for ap­
proaching regulation. Part II argues that Biegel's categories lack 
comprehensiveness, and that Biegel undermines his model by inaccu­
rately applying it to difficult situations. 
I. BIEGEL'S FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CYBERSPACE 
PROBLEMS AND REGULATION 
Biegel establishes a five-step framework for analyzing problematic 
conduct in cyberspace and for determining how to regulate it. The first 
step involves placing the behavior into one of four broad categories 
Biegel provides and then identifying representative characteristics (p. 
224). Once a regulator categorizes the problem, the second step forces 
him to consider the potential for consensus regarding the nature and 
extent of the problem, and the potential for any regulatory consensus 
among stakeholders (p. 224). The third step involves considering 
whether the problem is uniquely cyber, or if an existing regulatory 
scheme could address it (p. 224). Subsequently, step four requires 
evaluation of the potential effectiveness of the three regulatory mod­
els identified by Biegel.11 Finally, at step five the regulator must con­
sider the impact of each regulatory model in combination with the 
others and predict whether any regulation could adequately address 
the potential problem at this time (p. 225). 
In the first step of his framework, Biegel attempts to divide all 
cyberproblems into four simple categories: 1) Dangerous Conduct, 
2) Fraudulent Conduct, 3) Unlawful Anarchic Conduct, and 4) 
Inappropriate Conduct (p. 54). He defines Dangerous Conduct as 
"acts and behaviors that may impact physical or national security" 
(p. 55). Biegel includes threatening behavior such as cyberstalking 
(p. 55), creating and trafficking in child pornography (p. 57), unli-
11. P. 224. Discussed infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
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censed online healthcare (p. 58), and cyberterrorism (p. 62) under this 
heading. Fraudulent Conduct encompasses hacking that leads to 
financial loss (p. 65); traditional fraud in an online setting (p. 70) and 
deceitful business practices, including noncompliance with posted pri­
vacy statements (p. 66); and the undisclosed gathering of information 
by recording the users Internet protocol address. Unlawful Anarchic 
Conduct - the least self-defining of the groups - involves conduct 
"which may . . .  be illegal but may not necessarily be criminal" (p. 73). 
This would include copyright violations (p. 73), exposing others to 
pornographic content without adequate warning (p. 80), and online 
defamation (p. 81). One could fairly describe Inappropriate Conduct 
as a catchall category for other acts that many people do not like but 
which nevertheless remain lawful. The author gives the example of 
hate-related websites as typical of this category (p. 87), as well as 
overly aggressive business tactics (p. 91), discriminatory "hostile envi­
ronment" harassment (p. 87), and inappropriate online activity in an 
education setting (p. 88). 
Biegel believes that placing problematic behavior into one of these 
four categories makes it easier to identify common characteristics the 
"cyberproblems" share. Though he lists the potential for consensus as 
a separate step in his analysis (p. 225), in fact Biegel assumes that 
where the behavior falls in the hierarchy generally reflects the existing 
level of consensus.12 Thus, activity which physically harms others such 
as online child pornography will likely garner a wide consensus con­
demning the behavior, while socially unacceptable conduct - which 
Biegel admits will likely engender debate even about what qualifies as 
unacceptable - will produce little consensus. 
The third step, considering whether a problem is uniquely cyber, 
looks to whether current law can adequately handle the "cyberprob­
lem" without additional regulatory activity (p. 97). The regulator must 
also ask if the complexity of the issues along with the multiplicity of 
variables would make any attempt at regulation either ineffective, or 
the effects unpredictable (p. 107). 
Biegel also expends a significant amount of time discussing the 
three models of regulation he utilizes in step four of his overall ap­
proach. He believes these models capable of comprehensively regu­
lating Internet conduct (p. 220). The first regulatory model consists of 
the traditional method of applying national laws to a problem and de­
veloping new laws as necessary (p. 123). The United States can often 
effectively employ this form of regulation as the "great majority of 
online users at this point in time are American[s]" (p. 125). Although 
the U.S. can currently handle many problems through purely national 
legislation, as the Internet becomes a truly worldwide phenomenon, 
12. Pp. 223, 235. See infra note 41 for a discussion of the likely disagreement about be­
haviors falling into categories three and four. 
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this will become an increasingly less effective solution. As an initial 
matter, however, Biegel points out that this approach may fail in the 
short term more often than one might think. Frequently, this comes 
about because attempts to regulate the Internet often run into First 
Amendment problems, and the courts have struck down some of 
Congress's most high-profile attempts to regulate in this area.13 
Further, from a logistical standpoint, the sheer volume of online 
material inhibits effective regulation (p. 140). 
The second regulatory model addresses international consensus on 
how to handle a problem in cyberspace (p. 157). Such consensus has 
the advantage of simplifying the complexity created by jurisdictional 
problems and a multitude of individual nations' laws (p. 158). Plus, 
some problems remain beyond any single nation's ability to resolve. 
Given the global nature of the Internet, individual nation-states 
cannot control all Internet behavior that has an effect within their 
borders.14 The drawback of international laws, of course, comes from 
the need to find a consensus position each country will implement 
faithfully (p. 158). Despite this liability, international rules and proce­
dures already successfully control some online transactions.15 
The final regulatory approach considers changing the software 
codes that allow people to act in ways that national governments or 
the international community have deemed inappropriate (p. 187). 
Some argue that such "architectural changes" produce "immediate, 
final, and complete transformation[s]" (p. 188). Regulators cannot, 
however, ignore the fact that code changes by the "powers that be," as 
Biegel calls them, inevitably evoke responses by Netizens with the 
technological know-how to implement their own code countermea­
sures (p. 208). As Biegel defines the term, however, code-based solu­
tions can also entail efforts undertaken at the individual level.16 Thus, 
filtering software employed to protect children and those with delicate 
sensibilities also qualifies under this category (pp. 200, 204-07). 
13. P. 1 55. One prominent example would be the Communications Decency Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-104 5-502, § 110 Stat. 133 (1996). The Court struck down two highly controversial 
provisions, ostensibly meant to protect children, in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
P. 129. Biegel also discusses the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 231 
(1998), which the district court struck down, with the Third Circuit affirming this decision. 
Pp. 136-39. The Supreme Court, however, revers.ed, finding the COPA valid on its face. 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). Biegel also takes this discussion as an opportunity 
to point out the inappropriateness of individual states within the United States attempting to 
regulate Internet activity as some have done recently. Pp. 152-54. 
14. See, e.g., Mike McPhee, Items Taken in Ft. Collins Raid Under Study, DENVER POST, 
Sept. 5, 1998, at Bl (describing international cooperation in twenty-two countries to orches­
trate simultaneous raids against child-pornography ring using encryption technology). 
15. P. 176. In some e-commerce situations, Biegel believes that international rules and 
procedures control. P. 176. 
16. P. 205. Biegel provides no explanation why self-help remedies qualify as part of a 
regulatory model. 
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The final step in Biegel's model synthesizes the options presented 
by the three regulatory models, taking into account the particular 
problem under consideration, to produce a coherent regulatory 
approach (p. 225). Thus, for something such as child pornography, 
Biegel's model calls for individual nations to outlaw it and for some 
international agreement to prevent child exploiters from taking advan­
tage of international borders. Additionally, code-based solutions, such 
as removing any sites containing child pornography from the root 
server, also exist.17 
II. EXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BIEGEL'S 
APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
Although the theoretical framework presented by Biegel may 
pique academic interest, the real value of the theory should come in its 
application since he designed it for real-world regulators. Unfortu­
nately, while the framework does present some practical benefits, the 
model applications presented by Biegel raise problems. The following 
Part demonstrates that Biegel's model applications fail to faithfully 
implement the framework he developed. Sections II.A and II.B ques­
tion the viability of the categorization step as it now stands, and sug­
gest a slight alteration. Section II.C considers Biegel's proposal for 
dealing with online copying, the issue that "has become for many the 
paradigmatic cyberspace-related inquiry" (p. 74). Finally, Section II.D 
argues Biegel's decision to reject including private ordering in the 
model can cause regulators to ignore real solutions. 
A. Inconsistent Categorization: The Nuremberg Files 
Biegel's theory behind the four categories of cyberproblems18 
implies that the lower the number in his hierarchy, the easier it should 
be to establish a consensus on the need for action (p. 235). Thus, one 
can easily see why threats delivered over the Internet and child 
pornography would fall into the Dangerous Conduct category. Oddly 
though, Biegel also includes the facts of Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Williamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists19 as 
something that falls into the Dangerous Conduct category (p. 56). 
There an anti-abortion group, the American Coalition of Life 
17. P. 274. Thirteen root servers containing "authoritative lists of domain names and 
their corresponding IP numbers" make up the root server system. Root Server A is the main 
computer holding the address database. P. 194. The Eastern District of Virginia has already 
directed a website off the Internet by suspending a defendant's domain name registration. P. 
274. 
1 8. 1 )  Dangerous Conduct 2) Fraudulent Conduct 3) Unlawful Anarchic Conduct, and 
4) Inappropriate Conduct. P. 55. 
19. 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Activists (" ACLA") maintained detailed dossiers it called the 
Nuremberg Files so that "Nuremberg-like war crimes trials could be 
conducted in 'perfectly legal courts once the tide of the nation's opin­
ion turns against the wanton slaughter of God's children.' "20 The 
ACLA shared these dossiers with Neal Horsley, including the abor­
tion doctors' names and current addresses, which Horsley posted on 
his website.21 Whenever someone killed an abortion provider, Horsley 
would cross off the doctor's name on the posted list.22 
Biegel's categorization of the Nuremberg Files website in 
American Coalition creates internal inconsistencies in his categories 
for two reasons. First, while the district court did find for the plaintiff 
doctors, the Ninth Circuit overturned this decision "applying basic 
First Amendment principles" - to quote Biegel (p. 56). Though 
Biegel notes the controversy this caused, the fact that this case raised 
so much controversy indicates that Biegel may have miscategorized 
the activity under his own model.23 The authorities can clearly pro­
scribe the other activities he uses as examples for this category, as the 
public overwhelmingly supports such limits. Under current law, how­
ever, Horsley can operate his website without state interference. Thus, 
no strong consensus emerges that the law must do something about 
this site - since many would agree the First Amendment bars the 
state from doing anything. 
The second problem follows from the fact that this site seems to fit 
squarely within the category of Inappropriate Conduct. When giving a 
sample application of the model within the Inappropriate Conduct 
category, Biegel goes through a long analysis on how the government 
could ban hate-related websites if First Amendment law changes (pp. 
321-52). This chapter seems to describe exactly the kind of website at 
issue in American Coalition. Biegel might argue he could differentiate 
the two sites because Horsley's site referred to specific people, thus 
perhaps seeming more like a threat, while a generic racially based 
hate-related website might not mention specific people - though 
many likely do. Since the sites simply promote different kinds of hate, 
however, the same category should apply. In the end, it seems that the 
American Coalition site fits better in the Inappropriate Conduct 
category - many believe the site operator should not have posted the 
Nuremberg Files, some would deny the site First Amendment protec­
tion, but the majority of Americans believe it protected (p. 348). This 
20. Id. at 1012-13 . 
21. Id. at 1013. 
22. Id. He grayed out the names of the wounded. Id. The plaintiffs, however, did not sue 
Horsley. Id. at nl. 
23. "For the problems in categories 1 and 2, consensus is not typically an issue, since the 
categories were organized in part by the likelihood that some degree of consensus could be 
reached in advance." P. 235. 
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fits with the low consensus Biegel envisions for Inappropriate Conduct 
(p. 326). 
Yet no problem should fit within both the Dangerous Conduct 
category and the Inappropriate Conduct category as Biegel envisions 
them. Biegel claims that his "categories are designed to be both flexi­
ble and fluid, with certain types of generic behavior fitting under more 
than one category depending on specific factors that might be 
present . . . .  " (p. 54). He then goes on, however, to define Inappropri­
ate Conduct as "immoral or offensive acts that do not fit under any of 
the other" categories. 24 This statement just reinforces the idea that this 
category is a catchall, including only activities that the regulator could 
not place elsewhere. Of course, the problem could result from Biegel 
putting hate-related websites in the wrong category. One could 
imagine an argument that hate-related websites threaten the targeted 
groups physical security. Given Biegel's desperate attempts to craft 
a legal framework allowing the abolition of such sites (pp. 321-52), 
however, if he believed they qualified for the Dangerous Conduct 
label, he would likely have put them there. 
The real problem may be the genesis of Biegel's categories. 
Although Biegel presents them as coming from whole cloth, they 
roughly correspond with: 1) criminal conduct presenting the potential 
for physical harm (Dangerous Conduct), 2) criminal conduct leading 
only to nonphysical harm (Fraudulent Conduct), 3) noncriminal 
conduct leading to civil liability (Unlawful Anarchic Conduct), and 
4) noncriminal conduct not resulting in civil liability (Inappropriate 
Conduct).25 This method of considering Biegel's model explains why 
he would resist putting hate-related websites in the Dangerous 
Conduct category - the site operators have done nothing criminal. It 
also explains why going from category one to four roughly tracks con­
sensus as to the need to do something about the behavior (p. 223). As 
a society, we have already made these decisions. 2 6  Comparing the 
underlying categories with Biegel's categories clearly demonstrates the 
24. P. 85 (emphasis added). Oddly enough, he also defines Unlawful Anarchic Conduct 
as mutually exclusive of the other categories. He says such behavior presents no danger to 
physical safety or national security, thus it cannot be Dangerous Conduct. Additionally, the 
fact that the behavior does not generally qualify as fraudulent or dishonest serves as a "dis­
tinguishing feature," thereby falling outside Fraudulent Conduct (the lack of fraud and dis­
honesty can hardly serve to distinguish category three from category two if the two catego­
ries are not mutually exclusive - and this holds true whether Biegel qualifies his statement 
with "generally" or not). P. 73. 
25. The two categorization systems do not completely correspond. Some actions Biegel 
includes in Dangerous Conduct constitute crimes not resulting in physical harm for instance. 
But, as discussed in Section II.B infra, these categorizations put strain on Siegel's model. 
26. Of course Biegel might argue that the political system did not adequately consider 
the views of all stakeholders in making the decision. This, however, criticizes our political 
system in general, and Biegel does not propose a more effective way of canvassing and 
measuring stakeholders' views. 
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under inclusivity of Biegel's, despite his statement that this approach 
"divide[s] . . .  problem areas into four categories."27 Proper categoriza­
tion of the behavior comes in step one, upon which the others rely. 
B. Miscategorization: Cyberterrorism 
Even more problematic are Biegel's attempts to fit cyberterrorism 
within the Dangerous Conduct category. Starting from a clean slate, 
Biegel defines the Dangerous Conduct category as "composed of acts 
or behaviors that may impact physical or national security" (p. 55). 
Biegel uses the denial-of-service attacks of February 200028 as an ex­
ample of the cyberterrorism that the Dangerous Conduct category 
would cover (pp. 229-31). He employs two gambits to include these 
attacks in this category. The first posits that blocking major websites, 
used by so many people, presents a threat to national security (p. 233). 
He supports this by saying that the United States government viewed 
such behaviors in terms of national security, seemingly oblivious to the 
fact that the government now appears to view everything in terms of 
national security.29 Biegel's most convincing argument in this regard 
turns on the fact that other attacks similar in nature would in fact 
threaten national security.30 
Biegel's second attempt to fit such acts into the Dangerous 
Conduct heading relies on the argument that denial-of-service attacks 
use intentional force directed at particular targets and result in injury 
(p. 235). In developing this argument, Biegel advocates using a very 
broad definition of "violent" in the online setting, which encompasses 
vehement or passionate speech and extreme or intense force caused 
27. P. 54. Biegel claims that by placing a problem in one of these categories, a regulator 
can identify representative characteristics of the problem, and thus can better conduct the 
following analysis. Although it might be helpful, i.e. to take into account what has or has not 
worked on other problems in the category, it does not appear essential to the analysis. As 
such, the regulator can apply the remainder of the model without this first step. 
28. These attacks involved the perpetrators planting software on nonsecure computers 
owned by third parties. Then, when the time came for an attack, the "cyberterrorists" mar­
shaled these computers to send an extreme volume of requests to the targeted websites, with 
the intent of denying others access to the sites. The websites targeted included Yahoo, 
Amazon.com, eBay, CNN, eTrade, ZDNet, and Datek. Pp. 229-30. 
29. P. 233. For examples of the growth of the national-security argument's influence see, 
for examples, Robert Schlesinger, Citing Oil Need, Bush Pushes Energy Bill Senate Seeks 
Block on Arctic Drilling, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2001, at A6 (discussing national security 
interest in oil as a reason for drilling in wildlife preserves), and T. Shawn Taylor, In the 
Name of Homeland Security, CHI. TRJB., Mar. 9, 2003, § 5, at 5 (discussing governmental use 
of national security concerns to fight federal-employee unions and worries about sexual 
harassment claims). In fairness to Biegel, he completed this book before September 11th. 
Merely parroting the government line about this being a national security issue, however, 
does not prove anything. 
30. P. 234. Cyberterrorists previously attempted to disable communication systems. P. 
234. 
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by unexpected or unnatural sources.31 This allows him to place 
cyberterrorism in a category in which it does not belong. 
When reading this portion of the book, many will find the similari­
ties to the civil-rights sit-ins in the South striking.32 There the 
protesters caused a denial of service by taking up places at lunch 
counters and other public accommodations that would not serve them. 
By sheer numbers, they could effectively disrupt service by taking up 
all the available space until the proprietors relented. The resulting 
racial strife certainly had greater national security implications than 
not being able to access Yahoo for three hours.33 What the "cyberter­
rorists" do mirrors the civil rights protests, only in an online setting.34 
In fact, Biegel himself describes the Electronic Disturbance Theater's 
("EDT") attempted denial-of-service attack on the Pentagon's website 
as an act of cyber civil disobedience.35 EDT calls its actions a virtual 
sit-in.36 Various groups have used electronic civil disobedience to pro­
test war, the treatment of minorities, and even terrorism itself.37 The 
only difference between the nonviolent civil rights protests of the 
1960s and these cyber protests originates from Biegel's decision to 
define violence as including directing your cyber presence toward a 
particular location as an act of force.38 While civil disobedience does 
often result in arrest in the real world, Biegel states that cyberter­
rorism - which in his view includes cyber sit-ins - "should arguably 
31 .  Pp. 231-32. This argument assumes something cyberterrorists do in directing their 
attack qualifies as force. 
32. An obvious difference between the two exists of course. Civil rights protesters risked 
beatings and arrest to make their point while many "cyberterrorists" want to remain anony­
mous. Additionally, some cyberterrorists utilize the property of innocent third parties 
without their consent. P. 229. This is not true, however, of EDT. EDT protesters use Flood­
net, a Java applet, that automatically reloads the targeted webpage every three seconds, but 
they do not use third-party property. Jeanne Carstensen, Hey Ho, We Won't Go: Civil Dis­
obedience Comes to the Web, available at http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists­
Archives/nettime-l-9806/msg00012.html (last visited May 2, 2003). 
33. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (suggesting the civil rights movement created a national 
security issue for America in the fight against communism). 
34. Biegel uses the loaded term "cyberterrorists" very liberally. Those who practice 
electronic civil disobedience claim their activism follows in the footsteps of Henry David 
Thoreau and Gandhi. See Stefan Wray, On Electronic Civil Disobedience (1998), available at 
http://www.thing.net/-rdom/ecd/oecd.html. Clearly they do not view themselves as terrorists 
anymore than the civil rights protesters of the 1960s considered themselves to be terrorists. 
35. P. 241. The Pentagon responded with a counteroffensive, flooding the browsers 
launching the attack with graphics and messages, causing them to crash. P. 241. 
36. See Paul Van Slambrouck, Newest Tool for Social Protest: The Internet, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, June 1 8, 1 999, USA 3. 
37. See John Lasker, Hactivists Wage War, BUFF. NEWS, May 14, 2002, at El. 
38. Biegel would declare the equivalent of walking in the door of the diner and sitting 
down to be an act of force. 
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have the same level of punishment . . .  [as] offline penalties for terror­
ism. "39 
It seems quite odd that Biegel himself would have to strain to fit 
anything into the different categories. After all, he created them only a 
few pages earlier, and one would think he could have finessed the 
categories rather than warping the definitions of the conduct involved 
to obtain the desired result. This may flow from the fact that the 
stakeholders would likely agree that the government should do 
something about such attacks40 - meaning in Biegel's framework the 
behavior should fit into category one or two41 - but the actual acts 
committed do not nicely fit into either Dangerous Conduct or 
Fraudulent Conduct without manipulation. The fact that this behavior 
does not seem to fit well within the framework prescribed leads to 
additional questions about the comprehensiveness of the categories. 
Perhaps more categories would solve the problem - but of course 
with additional categories the attractive simplicity of the system de­
clines. 
C. Ignoring the Model: Giving in to the Copyright Anarchists 
In marked contrast to his recommendations concerning denial-of­
service attacks, where Biegel would treat cyber activists in the same 
way as real-world terrorists, he professes his willingness to abandon 
the current copyright regime as being unrealistic in the online world. 
Since copyright infringement constitutes one of the most cont�ntious 
Internet-related problems (p. 280), Biegel does not feel the need to fit 
copyright violators into the Dangerous Conduct category - despite 
his argument that extreme economic harm can have national security 
implications.42 Here the fact that many online users are violating the 
current copyright provisions on an almost daily basis persuades him of 
the wisdom of this action.43 He proposes to scrap the current copyright 
39. P. 239. This does not mean cyber activists should not be punished for the crimes they 
commit. It merely aims to make clear the extent of the punishment Biegel proposes, and the 
activities to which he would attach those punishments. The situation requires a more 
nuanced approach than Biegel advocates. 
40. P. 235. For discussion of the role of consensus in Siegel's model, see supra notes 12, 
23-24 and accompanying text, and infra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text. 
41. Biegel contends that someone applying his method can place all problematic be­
havior into one of his categories. He then specifically notes that low consensus will typify 
category four and sets up category three in terms of large numbers of people on both sides of 
the debate. He expects high consensus in categories one and two. P. 235. 
42. P. 281. The sale of copyrighted materials accounts for six percent of the United 
States' gross national product. Laurie A. Santelli, New Battles Between Freelance Authors 
and Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 253, 269 
(1998). 
43. P. 280. Biegel never clarifies why radical proposals to change the substantive law 
enter into the analysis. His model does allow for changes in the law in steps three through 
five when the stakeholders come to agreement. This proposal does not result from an appli-
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provisions in exchange for a simpler system that online users will 
understand.44 
His analysis raises several potential problems. Biegel claims an 
emerging pattern in the case law allows for private personal copying 
under the fair-use defense.45 Yet for all of Biegel's attention to the 
fair-use doctrine in relation to private personal copying, he ignores 
cation of this process. Biegel makes much of the fact that stakeholders cannot come to 
agreement in this field. In apparent response to this, Biegel makes a proposal that does not 
resolve this inability to agree (one side will certainly reject it and the other might or might 
not support it). Simply because Biegel believes his proposal well-reasoned and fair does not 
mean the stakeholders will agree to it, but Biegel makes no effort to deal with this lack of 
consensus. 
44. P. 303. The belief that simplicity holds the key to copyright compliance undergirds 
Biegel's proposed reforms. P. 303. This is a fundamentally flawed vision of the law. Biegel 
argues that since no lay person could understand this area of the law, society cannot expect 
Netizens to follow copyright law. Siegel's argument here rests on an unacknowledged - and 
highly dubious - assumption. Namely, Biegel assumes that Netizens know about the fair­
use doctrine, want to comply with it, but simply cannot figure out how to do so. P. 303. He 
seems to envision Netizens combing through Westlaw searching futilely for clear conduct 
rules. Many areas of the law that society expects people to obey, however, display a similar 
complexity. For instance, when discussing the countermeasures various entities have taken 
against cyberterrorism, Biegel provides an extensive analysis of when the occupant of a 
building may inflict physical injury in defense of habitation. Pp. 242-44. The answer entails a 
complex analysis that turns on a number of variables. Pp. 242-44. Yet we expect people to 
conform their behavior to this standard despite the fact that they most likely have no clue 
that it exists. 
In fact, Meir Dan-Cohen maintains that overbreadth and vagueness, the antithesis of 
clear conduct rules, can become virtues in some areas of the law such as necessity and du­
ress. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 639 (1984). In such situations, society benefits when 
conduct rules (directed at the general populace) and decision rules (directed at those im­
posing punishment for crimes) differ so as to preserve the deterrence effect of the law. Id. 
The two need not fully overlap. Id. at 649. Dan-Cohen goes on to suggest that overbroad and 
vague laws that exhibit simplicity, when combined with fair decisional rules, can result in 
good law. Id. at 639. This, however, would not satisfy Biegel, or the purpose of the fair-use 
doctrine. Dan-Cohen's method covers more than society intends to punish to provide ade­
quate deterrence. Fair use does not seek to over deter, but encourages uses that qualify as 
fair. 
Complexity often results from an attempt to introduce fairness into the law because 
society expects conduct rules and decision rules to fully overlap. For instance, "thou shal(t] 
not kill," Exodus 20:13 (King James), is a simple law, but many would prefer the current 
criminal law, which allows for killing in self-defense, even if the law allows only a narrow and 
technical exception. The simplicity rationale is further undercut by the fact that people do 
not always obey simple laws despite the fact that they can determine compliance with little 
effort - the speed limit representing an excellent example. See Margaret Raymond, 
Penumbra! Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1397-99 (stating most Americans speed and 
estimating the percentage at somewhere between sixty-seven and ninety). 
45. P. 305. The fair-use defense resulted from judicial activism, a decision that fulfilling 
the purpose of the Copyright Act necessitated an exception to copyright owners' rights. See 
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 453 (2002). Eventu­
ally, Congress codified the fair-use defense, requiring the courts to look at four factors: 1) 
the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2003). Congress also left the courts free to consider additional factors that they 
may find relevant. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
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one of the major theories in the field - that fair use constitutes a form 
of market failure. 4 6  In the past, high transaction costs made low-value 
transactions unprofitable. 47 The Internet actually presented a possible 
way to reduce these transaction costs and thus would diminish the 
need to employ the fair-use doctrine. 48 
Further, Biegel's de minimis proposal, 49 which would allow people 
to download set portions of larger works and small works in their en­
tirety - for private noncommercial use only - then forward them on 
to a limited number of people (p. 306), advances a much more radical 
theory than he admits. He does, in fact, acknowledge that Congress 
would have to amend the Copyright Act to implement his proposal (p. 
306), but still attempts to justify it using fair-use concerns. Thus, in 
evaluating Biegel's suggested amendment, the four fair-use factors 
prove useful. so 
Biegel, without mentioning them specifically, seeks to justify his 
proposal on two of the fair-use grounds. He, in essence, wants to col­
lapse the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the work as a whole, into a per se rule, allowing 
"downloading . . .  documents of less than ten pages . . .  " and limited 
numbers of music files - presumably meaning entire songs. s1 Here, 
46. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1 600, 1 614-15 (1982). 
Gordon points out in a later piece, however, that just because no market failure remains 
does not automatically mean fair use should not apply. See Wendy J. Gordon, Market 
Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031, 
1031 -32 (2002). The law and economics articles which cite to Gordon largely disagree, or at 
least fail to acknowledge this point. 
47. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
51 (2002). 
48. The founding of the Copyright Clearance Center in 1 977 presented another option 
- and a reason for cutting back on the fair-use defense in certain instances. See American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994). The major problem to 
date on the Internet revolves around an economical way to charge for these low-value trans­
actions. 
49. One must realize that Biegel adopts an unnecessarily confusing name for his 
proposal. As he notes, copyright law already has a de minimis allowance, much more limited 
than what he suggests. The de minimis doctrine allows for "trivial instances of copying," On 
Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001), because trivial copying is not an 
infringement. 
50. He explicitly notes that the third fair-use factor addresses traditional de minimis 
issues. P. 306. 
51. P. 307. One can see where Biegel's desire for a simple Jaw begins to betray him here. 
If he sticks to the simple rule, it leads to anomalous results. If someone wishes to download a 
work with only one line on the eleventh page would his proposal bar this? If it does not, 
Biegel finds himself back in the case-by-case line drawing business, which he designed his 
simple rule to avoid. If it does, this raises another worry� Namely, inflexible Jaws often lead 
to nonsensical results. Biegel does not explain why the public should prefer a simple Jaw that 
leads to nonsensical results over a hard-to-interpret, complex rule striving for sensible out­
comes. One also wonders if Congress must provide a standard font, type size, and margins to 
guarantee compliance with this "simple" rule. Plus, Biegel's proposal seems incomplete. 
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Biegel commits the cardinal sin of conflating de minimis with small. 
Neither society nor copyright law judges a work by its length, and this 
proposal would alter the third factor to consider only the amount 
taken. As the Supreme Court noted in Harper & Row v. National 
Enterprises,52 however, the heart of a work can reside in a small per­
centage of the larger work, creating a need to consider substantiality.53 
While Biegel would prevent people from taking books and long arti­
cles in their entirety, he ignores the fact that the value of many works 
lies only in a small portion of a work.54 No doubt Biegel does not ad­
dress the concerns raised by the fourth fair-use factor, the effect his 
proposal would have upon the potential market for, or value of, the 
copyrighted work, for just this reason. Allowing everyone to download 
the work for personal use would destroy the market for many 
copyrighted works. Simply put, people use whole genres of 
copyrighted works only - or predominantly - for private personal 
and noncommercial purposes. Indeed, Biegel's proposal may present a 
takings issue. His amendment to the Copyright Act would take small 
works from their owners and put them in the public domain because 
no work under ten pages would receive protection in noncommercial 
settings and online users could download the most valuable parts of 
other works (p. 307). Biegel attempts to counter this by insisting that 
the purpose and nature of the use be noncommercial (p. 306) - the 
first fair-use factor. He fails to acknowledge, however, that the first 
factor is not the entire test because even noncommercial private uses 
can destroy the value of some works.55 
As for the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
Biegel apparently finds this unimportant, though he concerns himself 
mainly with works at the core of copyright law. Thus, Biegel plucks 
out the concerns underlying two of the fair-use factors while failing to 
comprehend why Congress - taking its cue from the courts -
included the other two factors in the test.56 The term de minimis comes 
from the longer Latin phrase de minimis non curat lex, which Biegel 
Much online infringement involves visual works, which the proposal fails to address. In fact, 
to meet Siegel's goal would require more of a civil law code than a short, simple law. 
52. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
53. Id. at 564-66, 579 (finding that taking three-hundred words from a 200,000-word 
book to be substantial). 
54. President Ford's autobiography, at issue in Harper & Row, provides a good exam­
ple. Everyone generally agrees that his reasons for pardoning President Nixon - contained 
in a small portion of the overall book - provided the material of most interest to a vast 
majority of the potential audience. See id. at 565, 568. 
55. Plus, it focuses on the noncommercial purpose of the use ignoring completely the 
nontransformative character of the use. See Kelly v. Arriba Software Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 
940-42 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the importance of transformative character). 
56. Indeed, his proposal only takes half of the concerns behind each factor he does con­
sider into account. 
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loosely translates as "the law does not take notice of, or concern itself, 
with very small or trifling matters" (p. 306). The complete destruction 
of a work's value hardly qualifies as trifling. For just this reason, de 
minimis, as the courts now use the term, refers only to truly trivial 
uses.57 
Biegel also attempts to use the Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios Inc.58 case to support a growing trend towards 
allowing private personal copying; however, this rings hollow (p. 299). 
In Sony, Universal Studios and Disney brought suit against Sony 
because of Sony's production of the Betamax.59 The Betamax func­
tioned like a VCR,60 enabling the user to time shift "to record a 
program he cannot view as it is being televised and then watch it once 
at a later time."61 Content producers feared this would lead to people 
watching less television and attending fewer movies.62 The holding of 
the Sony decision allowed private personal copying in the context of 
free, over-the-air broadcast as a fair use.63 In part, this flowed from the 
Court's belief that the time-shifting would actually produce more 
profit than televised shows and movies alone.64 
This argument overlooks several key differences, however, 
between Sony and Biegel's favorite topic, songs downloaded and 
stored in the MP3 format. Justice Stevens - presciently according to 
Biegel - predicted that revenues would actually increase due to time­
shifting - and they have (p. 309). Downloading songs off the Internet 
is not, however, time-shifting - it does not record broadcast music as 
presented free over the air by its creators for one time use later.65 The 
Court only authorized time-shifting, and downplayed the likelihood 
people would try to build videotape libraries rather than watching the 
content once and recording over the program.66 Biegel notes the Court 
avoided deciding if building personal libraries of copyrighted works 
without payment constitutes a fair use (p. 299). MP3s, however, 
squarely present the issue because people do try to put together music 
57. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001). 
58. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
59. Id. at 420. 
60. Id. at 422. 
61. Id. at 421. 
62. Id. at 452-53. 
63. Id. at 425. 
64. P. 300 (referring to Sony, 464 U.S. at 443, 446-47, 452-53). Given the current prere­
corded videotape and DVD market, this prediction proved true. 
65. The Court expressly declined to address the transfer of private copyrighted material 
among individuals that Biegel advocates in his de minimis proposal. Sony. 464 U.S. at 425. 
66. Id. at 421, 424 n.3, 451. 
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libraries on their computers by downloading songs off the Internet.67 
While increasing the number of people who see television shows does 
benefit the content producers in terms of advertising rates, increased 
audience without a corresponding increase in record sales provides lit­
tle benefit.68 
Attempting to counter this observation, Biegel writes "[f]rom the 
time that audiotaping technology first developed, industry officials 
have raised the specter of alleged lost profits . . .  [y ]et the record com­
panies continue to make large sums of money, and music industry 
profitability overall has shown no concrete signs of abating" (p. 308). 
While this might have seemed true at the beginning of 2001, it is no 
longer so.69 The profitability of the music industry dropped dramati­
cally over the last several years, and industry executives blame this in 
large part on the practices that Biegel wants to hold harmless.70 Biegel 
suggests that the music industry should find a way to profit from this 
downloading - but tellingly does not offer any suggestions as to how 
to do so (pp. 300-01, 309). 
67. See Hiawatha Bray, Recording Industry Shows Some Cunning, ST. PETERSBU RG 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at C4 (discussing use of the Internet to build music collections); 
Wherehouse Music Retailer Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 22, 2003, 
at lOB (same). 
68. See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 61, 64 (2002) ("[T]he cumulative . . .  impact of private copies, particularly if the copy­
ing becomes widespread and systematic, may be quite deleterious and should be pre­
vented"). Concert attendance generally does not provide a benefit to the record studio that 
produces an album. See Adam Sherwin, Rock Artists Sign Up to Live Bootleg CDs, THE 
TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 17, 2003, at Home News 5 (reporting the first contract with a leading 
artist, Robbie Williams, where the studio will get a cut of the gate). Traditionally, concert 
tours were meant to promote record sales, but this has changed for some of the most high 
profile acts. See Rodney Ho, The Long Goodbye: On Her Latest 'Farewell' Tour, Singer Cher 
Illustrates How Hard It Can Be for Those in the Limelight to Leave It for Good, ALA. J. & 
CONST., Apr. 25, 2003, at IE (discussing how some acts now make more off of ticket sales 
than album sales). This does not solve the problem for less well-known acts that cannot 
charge exorbitant prices for tickets. Nor do groups who can charge such prices need the ad­
ditional exposure, and fans willing to spend so much for tickets would likely have bought the 
album if they could not download it for free. 
69. Jeff Leeds, After a Rocky Year, Time to Face the Music, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, 
at Cl. Biegel does say "concrete signs," thereby indicating that the downward trend was al­
ready apparent then. P. 308. Biegel also claims the music industry cannot base loss estimates 
on the number of MP3 files downloaded because such activity differs from CD piracy. P. 309. 
As Biegel himself continually points out elsewhere, however, effective does not mean per­
fect. With an adequate statistical analysis the industry can establish roughly how much loss 
MP3 downloading produces - though no doubt what they release publicly may skew 
towards the high end of an honest analysis. His baseline reliance on CD piracy also fails -
all those willing to pay the price a pirate charges may not be willing to pay the authorized 
price, but we do not say that the industry can establish no estimate of the loss in this situa­
tion. Additionally, Biegel says, somewhat misleadingly, that "sampling" a song by down­
loading it could lead to album sales - but conveniently ignores the fact that it could also rob 
"one-hit wonders" of any significant revenue. P. 309. 
70. Patrick MacDonald, Music-Industry Meltdown, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at 
Kl. Others blame it on the low quality of the product, id., but this does not explain the vast 
numbers of people downloading the recordings now. 
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Biegel also seems to have an unrealistic view of the fair-use de­
fense overall. He refers to the rights of online users in the context of 
fair use (p. 295), but fair use is a shield, not .a sword.71 Infringers can 
protect themselves from liability in an infringement action if they 
qualify for the defense, but cannot force the intellectual property 
holder to grant them access to the material. The Copyright Act only 
grants copyright owners rights. Additionally, his proposal does not ac­
tually provide a solution. His proposal will exist along side current 
fair-use law (pp. 306-07), displacing only a portion of it, thus undercut­
ting his simplicity rationale. 
At a more fundamental level, one can disagree with Biegel on the 
extent of Netizens' disdain for the copyright law as it now stands. 
Biegel states that "N etizens [have] demonstrat[ ed] a disrespect for the 
[copyright] law that has arguably not been seen since the days of 
prohibition. "72 Although the prevailing social norms in cyberspace 
do reflect a belief that copyright laws somehow do not apply there 
(pp. 74-76), this does not mean that society should abandon copyright 
law on the web as it now stands because of these social norms.73 In the 
past, appeals by the creators of intellectual property have proven 
successful at persuading people to respect the originators enough to 
not steal their work.7 4 Plus, apparent disdain for copyright law might 
not run so deep as one might suppose on the Internet.75 
71. See, e.g., Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright 
Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 47 (1995). The name itself indicates a defense, not an affirma­
tive right. 
72. P. 290. This analogy enthralls Biegel, and he uses it repeatedly in regard to the social 
contract breaking down in regard to copyright. The analogy, however, is weak. Prohibition 
created criminal laws, while copyright involves mainly civil violations. Ignoring criminal laws 
indicates a greater breakdown in the social contract. See Raymond, supra note 44, at 1424 
(discussing how rarely enforced criminal laws, which do not induce social opprobrium and 
shame for violation, undercut the criminal law). In discussing the importance of the social 
contract, Biegel fails to distinguish between civil and criminal liability. People can incur civil 
liability without believing the law that forces payment illegitimate. One need look no further 
than efficient breach of contract to confirm this. See Richard A. Posner, The Strangest Attack 
Yet on Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 935-37 (1992). 
73. In the context of First Amendment social norms, Biegel advocates fighting these 
norms, p. 326, even after acknowledging that change might prove impossible. 
74. This observation finds support in Jane Ginsburg's latest work. See Ginsburg, supra 
note 68. Ginsburg believes " [c]opyright owners [are] generally perceived to be large, imper­
sonal and unlovable corporations (the human creators . . .  tend to vanish from the polemic 
view)." Id. at 61-62. Ginsburg specifically criticizes the view that any law "that gets in the 
way of what people can do with their own equipment in their own homes" is an illegitimate 
law, and labels this consumer greed. Id. 
This view also finds support in J.R.R. Tolkien's experience with American copyright 
law. In 1965, Ace Books published an unauthorized edition of each book in The Lord of the 
Rings trilogy on the belief that the American copyright was no longer valid. William A. 
Davis, Hobbit Forming, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1991 (Magazine), at 13. J.R.R. Tolkien, in 
response, included the following on the back cover of each authorized book in the trilogy 
published for the American market: "A STATEMENT FROM THE AUTHOR ABOUT THIS 
AMERICAN EDITION: 'This paperback edition, and no other, has been published with my 
consent and co-operation. Those who approve of courtesy (at least) to living authors will 
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More importantly for Biegel's proposal, he seems to ignore the fact 
that several of the regulatory models he uses in step four, namely code 
solutions and traditional n,ational law, could implement current law 
(pp. 290-91). If problems in earlier steps counsel regulators to ignore 
real solutions, then the proposal is of little use. For instance, a national 
law based solution to the seemingly intractable problem of Netizens 
refusing to pay sales tax on Internet purchases indicates regulators 
might continue working with national law solutions to good effect 
without radical changes.7 6 As for traditional national law in the copy-
purchase it, and no other.' " J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING back cover 
(Ballatine Books 1 972) (1965); J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE Two TOWERS back cover (Ballatine 
Books 1 972) (1 965); J.R.R . TOLKIEN, THE RETURN OF THE KING back cover (Ballatine 
Books 1972) (1965). Later, in 1992, a district court held that distributing a large number of 
foreign published copies of the work without copyright notice - a violation of § 9 of the 
1909 copyright act - does not cause invalidation. Eisen, Durwood & Co., Inc. v. Tolkien, 
794 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1 992). As far as Ace was concerned, however, this ruling was 
irrelevant. Even though the publishing houses believed Tolkien had no copyright protection 
in America, his tactic was so effective that Ace discontinued further publications and paid 
Tolkien royalties. It claimed it had not paid the royalties earlier because it did not have 
Tolkien's address. Ace's own authors then simultaneously mailed their publisher the address 
in a campaign coordinated by Ballatine, Tolkien's American publisher. Philip Marchand, 
Ballatine and Tolkien Made Sci-Fi Go Sky High, TORONTO STAR, May 9, 1991, at ES. The 
cover statement became so famous that when Signet Books published a parody of The Lord 
of the Rings, the authors included a parody of the statement as well. See HENRY N. BEARD 
& DOUGLAS c. KENNEDY, BORED OF THE RINGS back cover (Signet Books 1969) ("A 
STATEMENT FROM THE AUTHORS OF THIS LAMPOON EDITION: This paperback edition, and 
no other, has been published for the purpose of making a few fast bucks. Those who approve 
of courtesy to a certain other living author will not touch this gobbler with a ten-foot 
battle-lance.") The music industry recently began a similar campaign with some of its biggest 
stars. See MacDonald, supra note 70. 
75. On a recent visit to a discussion board, someone posted "caps" - an abbreviation of 
"screen captures," frozen stills taken from moving pictures - from a television show. An­
other board visitor immediately responded that he had originally produced those caps and 
posted them on a different discussion board and the second poster should not have reposted 
them. This led to a lively discussion with the general consensus being that the proper "neti­
quette" was for the original capper to "sign" his work so he could receive credit for it, but 
that once he posted it others could repost it. This suggests a respect for the author of a work, 
albeit one that differs substantially from what copyright law would prescribe - both posters 
were clearly violating copyright law. Posting copyrighted material on the Internet infringes 
on the copyright holder's l7 U.S.C. l(g) § 106(5) right of public display. See Kelly v. Arriba 
Software Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2001); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (D.N.J. 2002). It also violates the exclusive right 
of reproduction. See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940. Intellectual property holders might conceivably 
direct such attributive impulses into a greater respect for existing copyright law or some rea­
sonable variant. 
76. See David Colker, Will Smoke Cloud States' Tax Vision?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, 
at Cl. Netizens have ignored this tax just as they have ignored copyright law, yet a solution 
appears on the horizon and the states did not have to scrap their sales-tax laws to do it. The 
reader should also note that this law gained no more respect or compliance among Netizens 
due to its simplicity. This, despite the increasing difficulty of claiming ignorance of the law -
the telephonic tax filing system employed by many states insists on explaining the tax and 
making the taxpayers swear under penalty of perjury that they have paid all applicable taxes. 
Yet the feeling remains widespread among Netizens that only suckers pay this tax. Admit­
tedly, the states must make small adjustments to reconcile certain aspects of their tax codes 
but this is just the sort of "national law" solution Biegel expects. 
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right arena, several options remain untried, at least in regard to certain 
areas. In regard to MP3s, for example, an Audio Home Recording Act 
approach, which would force the collection and payment of royalties 
by MP3 manufacturers to copyright holders, might prove effective,77 
as might other smaller adjustments of the current law, without a 
wholesale overhaul. With respect to code-based solutions, in the very 
chapter dealing with copyright infringement, Biegel himself notes a 
possible solution - the Clever Content Server, which allows people to 
view an image but disallows screen captures and disables the "save as" 
feature on the browser (p. 319). Biegel describes this product as lead­
ing to a "potentially dystopian scenario" (p. 318-19) - where appar­
ently everyone would have to obey the law whether they wanted to or 
not.1s 
Biegel leaves the reader with the overall impression that he takes a 
dim view of the current copyright law, and therefore manipulates his 
regulatory model to advocate for change in deference to realism. In 
light of Biegel's views of online-hate sites, this attitude betrays an 
agenda-based application of the model on Biegel's part regarding the 
role of consensus. In the context of online hate sites, Biegel wants to 
challenge well-entrenched social norms - a.k.a. consensus - em­
bodied in constitutional interpretation (p. 323) - rather than "facing 
reality" as he would with online copyright social norms. 
D. Corrupting the Model: Regulating Online Hate 
In some ways, subjecting Biegel's analysis of online hate sites to an 
overly searching scrutiny seems unfair because he essentially admits 
that in devising a method of regulation for this area, he is getting his 
ice skates ready in case hell freezes over (p. 326). Biegel advocates 
nothing less than discriminatory regulation of speech based on content 
(pp. 326, 328), which a vast majority of the American people, both 
on the left79 and the right, oppose.80 Admirably, Biegel acknowledges 
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001-1010 (2003). When someone buys an MP3 player the law could 
require him or her to pay a royalty to copyright holders. Admittedly, this may well depress 
the sales of MP3 players, but these devices do contribute to a significant amount of copyright 
infringement. 
78. The apparent downside being that the Clever Content Server is not clever enough to 
distinguish between pages containing copyrighted material and those that do not and turning 
the relevant features off and on as necessary - though this may come about someday with 
advancing technology. This would not prevent all copyright infringement on the web, but it 
would cut down on it without radical change. 
79. At least as traditionally personified by the ACLU, though certain groups on the left 
disagree. See Philip Gailey, A C L U  Weakens Its Commitment to Free Speech, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at 2D (discussing traditional ACLU approach and its 
disagreement with some groups on the left over this approach). 
80. P. 323. Of course to say that most Americans oppose content discrimination vastly 
oversimplifies First Amendment law. The Court carves a number of things out from First 
Amendment protection such as fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 
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this and moves on to applying his model in the event of a First 
Amendment sea change.81 He chooses obscenity as his model for 
crafting speech regulations (p. 346). 
Why Biegel chooses obscenity as a model is a mystery. By hy­
pothesis, he assumes a change in First Amendment law, and, logically, 
regulators would shove online hate into the obscenity exception only if 
the more likely First Amendment exceptions, such as incitement, 
defamation, or harassment were unavailable.82 Part of this willingness 
to use obscenity as a model may result from Biegel's generosity in 
stating that the Supreme Court has a workable definition of obscenity 
that avoids vagueness and overbreadth problems (p. 346). A quick re­
view of the Court's obscenity jurisprudence calls this into question,83 
especially in the online context, as Biegel acknowledges elsewhere 
(pp. 41-42). Also, a First Amendment exception allowing only for the 
"regulation of certain narrowly defined categories of online hate" 
would seem to be unique in First Amendment law.84 
571-72 (1942), expression directed to inciting imminent lawless action, Brandenbug v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and libel, New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). When evaluating if speech falls into one of 
these unprotected areas, a court must consider the content. An alternative view maintains 
that the Constitution allows content restrictions but bars viewpoint discrimination - a gov­
ernment approved view. Am. Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). Ju­
rists, however, cannot follow this view blindly either - situations exist where the govern­
ment does have an "approved view" and it restricts speech on this basis. See, e.g., Leach v. 
Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922) (government and manufacturer opinions diverged on the effec­
tiveness of a drug, with the government preventing the manufacturer from disseminating its 
viewpoint through the mails). Suffice to say, for our purposes, a widely acknowledged con­
cept exists, often labeled discrimination based on content, barring the government from do­
ing exactly what Biegel proposes. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
81. Biegel thinks such a change possible because America lies far outside the interna­
tional mainstream on this issue. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme & 
L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171-72 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing French law 
banning the sale of Nazi-related items); Tania Branigan, Threat of War: The Strange Journey 
of a Salvation Army Boy Who Converted to a Campaign of Hate, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 25, 
2003, at 3 (discussing conviction of Muslim preacher for using threatening or abusive lan­
guage to stir up racial hatred), available at www.Lexis.com/universe; Jon Sawyer, U.S. 
Money in Egypt Obtains Mixed Results, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2002, at Bl (noting 
conviction of professor for defaming the state). He also acknowledges, however, that if the 
international community reaches an agreement, the U.S. view may prevail because of the 
United States' domination over the equipment of the Internet. P. 352. 
82. Biegel makes clear that case law currently bars these options. Pp. 328-38. 
83. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 41 3 U.S. 49 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("we are 
manifestly unable to describe (obscenity] in advance except by concepts so elusive that they 
fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech"). 
84. P. 347. Presumably Biegel chooses this approach under the assumption that the in­
ternational community forced this First Amendment exception upon an unwilling America 
who would want to comply with an international treaty calling for such an exception and no 
more. At the least, this narrow approach conflicts with his reasons for analogizing obscenity 
and online hate. One might expect this, as it flies in the face of Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). There the Court announced that 
simply because the government could proscribe the expression entirely does not mean it can 
discriminate based on the content within the proscribable area. Id. at 382-85. The First 
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Returning to the regulatory aspects, the question arises as to why 
Biegel opposes including private ordering85 as a model of regulation 
(p. 220). His stated reason that private ordering does not satisfy the 
requirement "that a regulatory model must be all encompassing, with 
the potential to address almost every controversy in cyberspace" (p. 
220) makes little sense.8 6 Biegel does acknowledge the benefits of sim­
ply having the webhosting site cease to offer hate-related sites space 
(p. 328). Namely, such private actors do not trigger the state action re­
quirement, and hence can act where the government could not in the 
face of First Amendment challenges (p. 328). While Biegel does not 
believe this would suffice, webhosting requires a significant capital 
outlay and adequate community pressure could convince these serv­
ices of both the immorality and the unprofitability of continuing to 
provide service to such sites.87 Proposing a regulatory scheme that has 
no chance of implementation while paying only lip service to a practi­
cal solution demonstrates an overcommitment to an academic idea, 
and a weakness in Biegel's model. 
CONCLUSION 
One can take issue with the particulars of Biegel's framework for 
evaluating and implementing regulatory changes. His categories are 
not comprehensive, and the credibility of his model suffers when he 
tries to force everything into one of them. At times, he appears willing 
to manipulate his model to achieve substantive goals. At other points, 
he seems willing to ignore real solutions to preserve the integrity of his 
model. The framework itself, however, does offer several important 
contributions. Namely, it forces the regulator to acknowledge that 
Amendment does not, however, "prohibit[] all forms of content-based discrimination within 
a proscribable area of speech . . .  a particular type of . . .  content discrimination does not 
violate the First Amendment when the basis for it consists entirely of the very reason its en­
tire class of speech is proscribable." Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 (2003) 
(O'Connor, J.) (allowing content discrimination in a c�oss-burning case as a true threat, the 
form of intimidation most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm). 
85. Private ordering involves self-regulation by Internet service providers. As private 
actors, the First Amendment does not constrain them. P. 220. 
86. Biegel's problem here originates with his all encompassing definition of code-based 
solutions. By including such noncomprehensive. solutions as content filters on individual 
computers under the code-based solution model, pp. 204-07, he can , include individually 
noncomprehensive solutions in his regulatory model. This approach gives the impression 
that labeling drives this analysis more than content. With such a broad definition of 
code-based solutions, Biegel could have included Internet service provider self-regulation 
under this heading. See p. 200 (including filter access provided by Internet service providers 
as a code-based solution). 
87. See Gary Williams, "Don't Try to Adjust Your Television - I'm Black " Ruminations 
on the Recurrent Controversy over the Whiteness of TV, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 99, 129-
31 (2000) (discussing the use of boycotts to effect social change, including racial justice); cf 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (discussing a .store's unsuccessful suit 
against such a social-justice boycott that hurt its business). 
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control of the Internet is not an all or nothing proposition. It also 
provides a step-by-step analysis requiring the regulator to think about 
the best way to achieve his or her goal. In the end, perhaps the most 
valuable contribution comes from this methodical approach, forcing 
regulators into a reasoned analysis. The question is will actual regula­
tors, unlike Biegel, be willing to go where the model leads them. 
